Who Won

The Second Day ?

The fighting on July 2 was once again a Confederate victory though an incomplete one at best, for the Army of the Potomac had escaped a potential complete disaster and retired to a secure defensive position. Again Lee's leadership had been wanting, nor had that of his subordinates been better. Longstreet's original plan of battle was probably technically superior to that which was eventually adopted, but he was somewhat careless in its execution, with the result that it was badly coordinated, and McLaws' men struck much later than ought to have been the case. Both Hill and Ewell should have been far more closely supervised. Hill had remained almost completely inactive for the entire day. Worse, by not getting Ewell to attack against the Union right at the same time that Longstreet struck their left, Lee permitted Meade to weaken himself on that side in order to restore his left flank after the collapse of the 3rd corps. Ewell's inexplicable lack of activity, bordering almost on the criminal, permitted a likely victory to turn into something approaching a drawn fight. Moreover, his attack on Culp's Hill later in the day, was foolish, unnecessary and hours too late to effect events in the center. Yet again the Confederate troops had fought splendidly, only to have little to show for all their courage and devotion.

Despite the reverse, Union leadership had done somewhat better. Meade had kept his head, appearing on all parts of the field to inspire the men and gain an understanding of the situation. He had confided in his most able subordinates, and eased the burden of command by placing Hancock and Slocum over the left and right wings of the army, respectively. They had done well, particularly Hancock, who seemed to be everywhere on the field at critical moments. Slocum handled the potential disaster on the Union right with considerable skill and Warren had been superbly effective, with his marvelous improvised defense of Little Round Top. Indeed, save for Sickles and Birney, the Union corps and division commanders had performed ably, and sometimes brilliantly. Sickles, of course, had been the cause of the disaster which involved his corps, and many other troops. Indeed, had the 3rd corps held its assigned position along Cemetery Ridge, it would have been ideally placed to take in the flank Longstreet's attack along the Emmitsburg road. Birney contributed to the disaster when he left his division to go off and assume command of the disintegrating 3rd corps after Sickles had been wounded.

The lower ranking Union officers had generally, almost universally done well, most notably in the fighting around Little Round Top and the collapsing center. Their performance set the stage for the Union victory the next day.